On Sunday’s Philosophy in Action Radio, I’ll discuss what’s right (and wrong) with Aristotle’s defense of eudaimonia as the final end that’s given in Chapter One of the Nicomachean Ethics. I’m really excited to discuss the topic, as I think that his argument is (1) radically different from that given by Ayn Rand in “The Objectivist Ethics” (in The Virtue of Selfishness), yet (2) important and powerful and basically right.
In preparing my notes, I’ll draw on my teaching notes from my days as a graduate student instructor at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Hence, I thought I should post the selections from Chapter One of the Nicomachean Ethics that I assigned to students, as background context. It covers more ground than I’ll discuss on Sunday. (FYI: The translation is that of W.D. Ross, with some revisions made by Gregory Salmieri.)
Without further ado… I present you with Aristotle:
Chapter 1 [goods as ends of actions]
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, seems to aim at some good. For this reason the good has rightly been described as that at which all things aim.
But a certain difference is found among ends: some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities.
Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many. The end of the medicine is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of generalship victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity–as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under generalship, in the same way other arts fall under yet others–in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends. For it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned.
Chapter 2 [the good as the ultimate end of action]
Then what if there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and that we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain)? Clearly this end must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? If we have it, won’t we, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit on what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object.
It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And statesmanship appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since statesmanship uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete to attain or to preserve; though it is worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for state. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is statesmanship, in one sense of that term.
Chapter 3 [the methods of statesmanship]
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which statesmanship investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.
Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on statesmanship; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the deficiency does not depend on time, but on his living and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For immature men, like the incontinent get no benefit from their knowledge. But men who desire and act with reason will get a great benefit from knowing about these things.
These remarks about the student, the way our claims should be received, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.
Chapter 4 [the disputed nature of happiness]
Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say statesmanship aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honor; they differ, however, from one another–and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there is another which exists on its own and causes the goodness of all these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be arguable.
Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between arguments from and those to the principles. For Plato, too, was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, “are we on the way from or to the principles?” There is a difference, as there is in a race-course between the course from the judges to the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with what is known, things are objects of knowledge in two senses: some are known to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with things known to us. Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is fine and just, and generally, about the subjects of statesmanship must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting points. And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words of Hesiod:
Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another’s wisdom, is a useless man
Chapter 5 [three common views of the good]
However, let’s resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed. To judge from the lives that men lead, most men, and men of the most vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to identify the good, or happiness, with pleasure; which is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life: that just mentioned, the political, and thirdly the contemplative life. Now the mass of mankind are evidently quite slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts, but they get some ground for their view from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus.
A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honor; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it seems to depend on those who bestow honor rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something proper to a man and not easily taken from him.
Further, men seem to pursue honor in order that they may be assured of their goodness; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honored, and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then, according to them, at any rate, virtue is better. And perhaps one might even suppose this to be, rather than honor, the end of the political life.
But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all costs. But enough of this; for the subject has been sufficiently treated even in the current discussions. Third comes the contemplative life, which we shall consider later.
The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather take the aforementioned objects to be ends; for they are loved for themselves. It is evident that not even these are ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them. Let us leave this subject, then.
Chapter 7 [Aristotle's own account of the good]
Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each? Surely, that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in generalship victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else; and, in every action and pursuit, it is the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.
So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are complete; but the chief good is evidently something complete. Therefore, if there is only one complete end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most complete of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that which is desirable in itself more complete than that which is desirable for the sake of something else; and, if something is desirable in itself and never desirable for the sake of anything else, we call it more complete than things that are desirable both in themselves and for the same of something else. Therefore we call something “complete without qualification” if it is always desirable in itself and never desirable for the sake of something else.
Now happiness, above all else, is held to be such a thing; for we always choose happiness for itself and never for the sake of something else. While we do choose honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), we also choose them for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.
From the point of view of independence the same result seems to follow; for the final good seems to be independent. Now by independent we do not mean that which is enough for a man by himself–for someone who lives a solitary life–but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends’ friends we are in for an infinite series. Let’s examine this question, however, on another occasion. For now we define the independent as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and we think happiness is like this. Further we think that it is the most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others. If it were counted as one good amongst others, it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an extra good, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something complete and independent, and is the end of action.
Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ seems to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function.
Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may we likewise ascribe to man a function apart from all these?
What then could this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal.
There remains, then, an active life of the part that has reason. Of this, one part has reason in the sense of obeying reason, the other in the sense of having reason and thinking. And, since “life of the rational part” also has two meanings, we must state that we mean life in the sense of activity; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term.
So, man’s function is an activity of soul with reason. We say that the function of a thing is the same in kind as the function of a superb thing of the same type. For example, the function of a lyre player and of a superb lyre player are the same in kind. The same goes for all cases without qualification, if we add superiority with virtue to the function (for the function of a lyre player is to play the lyre, and that of a superb lyre player is to do so well). We say that man’s function is a certain kind of life, and that it is activity or actions of the soul involving reason, so the function of a superb man is to do these actions well and finely. And, if any action is done well when it is done with the appropriate virtue, the human good turns out to be activity of soul with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, with the best and most complete.
But we must add “in a complete life”. For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.
Let this serve as an outline of the good; for we must presumably first sketch it roughly, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that any one is capable of carrying on and articulating something, once it’s been outlined well and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work–this is how the arts have improved, for any one can add what is lacking to the outline. We must also remember what we said before, and not look for precision in all things alike. Rather, in each class of things, we should look for the sort of precision as accords with the subject-matter, and for the amount that us appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the former does so in so far as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires in to what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth. We must act in the same way, then, in all other matters as well. This way we’ll avoid subordinating out main task to minor questions. And we shouldn’t demand the cause in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as in the case of the principles; the fact is the primary or the principle. Now we study some principles by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and we also study others in other ways. But we must try to investigate each set of principles in the natural way, and we must take pains to state them definitely, since they have a great influence on what follows. For the beginning seems to be more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it.
Chapter 8 [kinds of goods]
We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash.
Now goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers. It is correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external goods.
Another belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. …
With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.
Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself.
For, besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgment is such as we have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos–
Most noble is that which is most just, and best is health;
But pleasantest is it to win what we love.
For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one–the best–of these, we identify with happiness.
Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the luster from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue.
Chapter 13 [virtue and the soul]
Since happiness is an activity of soul with complete virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps this will enable us to study happiness better. Plus the true student of statesmanship seems to have studied virtue above all things; for he wishes to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws. As an example of this we have the lawgivers of the Cretans and the Spartans, and any others of the kind that there may have been. And if this inquiry belongs to statesmanship, clearly the pursuit of it will be in accordance with our original plan.
But clearly the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good we were seeking was human good and the happiness human happiness. By human virtue we don’t mean virtue of the body but virtue of the soul; and we also call happiness an activity of soul. But if this is so, clearly the student of statesmanship must know somehow about the soul, as the man who is to heal the eyes or the body as a whole must know about the eyes or the body. All the more so, since statesmanship is more prized and better than medicine; but even among doctors the best educated spend put a lot of work into acquiring knowledge of the body. The student of statesmanship, then, must study the soul, and must study it with these objects in view, and he must do so just to the extent which is sufficient for the questions we are discussing; for further precision may take more work than our purposes require.
We have made some points about the soul adequately even in our popular works, and we must use these. For example, we said that one part of the soul is non-rational and one has reason. Are these parts separated like the parts of the body or of anything divisible are, or are they distinct in definition but inseparable by nature, like convex and concave in the circumference of a circle? It does not matter for our present purposes.
One part of the non-rational part seems to be widely distributed and is plantlike in its nature. I mean the part that causes nutrition and growth; for we can assign this capacity to nurslings and to embryos, and also assign this same capacity to full-grown creatures (since this is more reasonable than assigning some other capacity to them). Now the virtue of this part seems to be common to all species and is not specifically human; for this part or capacity seems to be most active during sleep, when goodness and badness are at their least distinct (that’s why people say that “happy people are no better off than miserable people for half their lives”). This isn’t surprising, because sleep is inactivity of the soul insofar as it is called great or base, unless perhaps some of the movements actually penetrate a little so that the dreams of great men are better than those of ordinary people. Enough of this subject, however; let us leave the nutritive part alone, since it has by its nature no share in human virtue.
There seems to be also another non-rational part in the soul–one which in a sense, however, shares in reason. For we praise the rational part of the continent man and of the incontinent, i.e. the part of their souls that has reason, since it urges them correctly and towards the best objects; but we also find in them another part naturally opposed to reason, which fights against it and resists it. It’s just like when we try to turn paralyzed limbs to the right and they do the contrary and move to the left. That’s how it is in the soul: the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions. But in the case of the body we see the part that goes astray, and in the soul we do not. Nevertheless, we must suppose that there is something in the soul contrary to reason, resisting and opposing it. In what sense it is distinct from the other parts does not concern us. Now even non-rational part his seems to have a share in reason, as we said; at any rate in the continent man it obeys reason and presumably in the temperate and brave man it’s even more obedient; for in him it speaks, on all matters, with the same voice as reason.
Therefore the non-rational part also appears to be two-fold. For the plantlike part in no way shares in reason, but the appetitive and in general the desiring part in a sense shares in it, in that it listens to and obeys it; this is the sense in which we speak of “listening to reason” from your father or your friends, not that in which we speak of “give reasons” in mathematics. Our practices of giving advice and admonishing and exhorting people also indicates that the non-rational part is persuaded by reason in some sense. And if we must say that this part has reason, then the part that has reason (as well as the part that doesn’t) will be bipartite: one subdivision will have it in the strict sense and in itself, and the other will have it in the sense of obeying, like one does with one’s father.
Virtue is also divided this way; for we say that some of the virtues are “virtues of thought” and that others are “virtues of character”. Theoretical wisdom, comprehension, and practical-wisdom are virtues of thought, and generosity and temperance are virtues of character. For in speaking about a man’s character we do not say that he is wise or comprehending but that he is mild or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also because of his state, and we call praiseworthy states “virtues”.
As I mentioned in my radio discussion of recommended works of Aristotle, I recommend the W.D. Ross translation of Nicomachean Ethics — or its derivatives.
The version in the epic two-volume set of The Complete Works of Aristotle (Volume 1 and Volume 2) edited by Barnes has been modified slightly by J.O. Urmson, and I like that one too. Also, Urmson has a nice little book on Aristotle’s Ethics. I’ve not read the whole book, but his discussion of Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility is quite good.
Finally, I definitely recommend reading the Nicomachean Ethics with Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics on hand. I don’t always agree with my friend Tom, but he’s reading Aristotle straight — not with any Christian gloss — and he’s remarkably accurate and insightful.
Update: Now that the 30 June 2013 episode of Philosophy in Action Radio is complete, you can listen to or download the relevant segment of the podcast here:
For more details, check out the question’s archive page. The full episode – where I answered questions on Aristotle on the final end, dealing with a morally corrupt sibling, studying philosophy in academia, the legality of DDoS attacks, and more – is available as a podcast too.