Friends and Fans — I have retired from my work as a public intellectual, so Philosophy in Action is on indefinite hiatus. Please check out the voluminous archive of free podcasts, as well as the premium audio content still available for sale. My two books — Responsibility & Luck: A Defense of Praise and Blame and Explore Atlas Shrugged — are available for purchase too. Best wishes! — Diana Brickell (Hsieh)


Certainty

  • Q&A: Accusations of Date Rape: 6 Sep 2015, Question 2
  • Question: What's the proper response to an accusation of date rape in the absence of hard evidence? When faced with this kind of serious accusation within a social group, what is the proper judgment and course of action? If the accuser seems believable, should the accused be shunned or banned from the group? Should private warnings be given to group members? Does refusing to engage in any public discussion of the matter constitute silent assent to the crime? Or should judgment and action be reserved until further evidence comes to light?

    Tags: Certainty, Crime, Epistemology, Ethics, Evidence, Law, Relationships, Sanction

  • Q&A: Confidence in Opinions: 16 Aug 2015, Question 1
  • Question: How much confidence should a person express in her own opinions? I work with a woman who constantly makes declarative statements about things for which she lacks sufficient facts and knowledge. The result is that she is often contradicted and people have to tell her, "That's not true." She will argue with them and then they have to prove her wrong so that the conversation can move forward. By contrast, I've noticed that I often express uncertainty in ways that undermine confidence in my knowledge and experience. The default position I tend to take is that maybe I am missing something and the other people in the conversation can give me that information. How does one learn to strike the right balance between being open to new facts and information but also being confident in one's own knowledge and experience?

    Tags: Certainty, Confidence, Epistemology, Irrationality, Psychology, Rationality, Rhetoric

  • Q&A: The Morality of the Death Penalty: 22 Jan 2012, Question 2
  • Question: Is the death penalty moral? I understand why people are opposed to the death penalty when there might be genuine doubt as to whether the accused person really committed the crime. Certainly, we've seen cases where DNA evidence has exonerated someone who was convicted several years ago for a crime they didn't actually commit. But if someone confesses to first degree murder and if there's incontrovertible physical evidence to confirm their guilt, is the death penalty then appropriate?

    Tags: Certainty, Crime, Death Penality, Epistemology, Ethics, Justice, Law, Punishment, Rights


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